大外交青年智庫·深圳
Glory Diplomacy
讓中國外交青年智慧被全球看見
為中國青年智庫代言
大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心
作者：亨利?A?基辛格
譯者：大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心
來源：《基式外交研究》2025年第18期“經(jīng)典文獻(xiàn)重譯”專欄文章
審定：基式外交研究中心學(xué)術(shù)委員會(huì)
文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "The Rules on Preventive Force." The Washington Post, April 9, 2006.
聲明：基式外交研究中心轉(zhuǎn)載、編譯與翻譯的內(nèi)容均為非商業(yè)性引用（學(xué)術(shù)研究），不作商用，版權(quán)歸原作者所有。如有問題請(qǐng)即刻聯(lián)系，如需轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處
郵箱：fydwjzhuanyong@126.com
一、摘要
美國新版國家安全戰(zhàn)略延續(xù)“先發(fā)制人”承諾卻未引發(fā)如2002年的爭議，折射國際社會(huì)對(duì)新型威脅認(rèn)知的深化。傳統(tǒng)國際法框架下，自衛(wèi)權(quán)限于抵御迫在眉睫的攻擊，但現(xiàn)代大規(guī)模殺傷性武器擴(kuò)散與非國家行為體威脅，迫使規(guī)則重構(gòu)。當(dāng)前戰(zhàn)略困境在于：最佳行動(dòng)時(shí)機(jī)往往伴隨情報(bào)真空，而威脅成形時(shí)已錯(cuò)失干預(yù)窗口，丘吉爾警示納粹崛起的歷史教訓(xùn)印證此悖論?；粮窭迩濉跋劝l(fā)制人”與“預(yù)防性武力”本質(zhì)差異：前者針對(duì)已顯現(xiàn)攻擊意圖的實(shí)體（如恐怖組織），后者則針對(duì)未來潛在威脅。美國冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)未打擊中蘇核計(jì)劃表明，預(yù)防性武力不適用于已擁核國家，除非其直接實(shí)施侵略。防擴(kuò)散成為核心議題，但策略存在分歧：技術(shù)學(xué)派主張武力遏止擴(kuò)散進(jìn)程，政權(quán)性質(zhì)學(xué)派則區(qū)別對(duì)待“友好”與“敵對(duì)”擁核國?，F(xiàn)實(shí)政策需平衡兩者，承認(rèn)擴(kuò)散本身構(gòu)成系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。人道干預(yù)困境凸顯國際體系缺陷——無直接威脅時(shí)，盧旺達(dá)式種族屠殺亦難觸發(fā)行動(dòng)。結(jié)論強(qiáng)調(diào)：預(yù)防性戰(zhàn)略需轉(zhuǎn)化為可操作機(jī)制，通過多邊協(xié)商構(gòu)建新秩序。大國須超越單邊主義，在共同依賴全球經(jīng)濟(jì)、共擔(dān)失控風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的現(xiàn)實(shí)下，協(xié)同建立危機(jī)前預(yù)防體系，避免以災(zāi)難為改革代價(jià)。
二、中文
美國近期發(fā)布的第二份四年一度國家安全戰(zhàn)略報(bào)告未如2002年版般引發(fā)爭議，此現(xiàn)象值得深思。尤其值得注意的是，新版戰(zhàn)略聲明在措辭上完整保留了2002年版本中關(guān)于“先發(fā)制人戰(zhàn)略”的承諾。
當(dāng)先發(fā)制人原則首度提出時(shí)，國際社會(huì)普遍質(zhì)疑其違背了歷經(jīng)三個(gè)世紀(jì)演進(jìn)、最終載入1945年《聯(lián)合國憲章》的國際體系基本原則。雖然憲章第二條禁止侵犯他國“領(lǐng)土完整或政治獨(dú)立”，第五十一條確認(rèn)國家自衛(wèi)權(quán)的普遍適用，但法律框架的模糊性并未妨礙其有效運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。當(dāng)時(shí)大規(guī)模殺傷性武器擴(kuò)散速度相對(duì)緩慢，非國家行為體獲取此類武器的可能性更屬天方夜譚。國際社會(huì)之所以廣泛反對(duì)單邊擴(kuò)展自衛(wèi)權(quán)，實(shí)因各國不愿接受由單一國家主導(dǎo)定義并實(shí)施此類權(quán)利。
新版戰(zhàn)略獲得相對(duì)緩和的國際反應(yīng)，部分源于各國對(duì)新型威脅的認(rèn)知深化，部分得益于美國外交政策的調(diào)適為協(xié)商創(chuàng)造了新空間。國際社會(huì)正逐步接受一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)：現(xiàn)代科技與國際實(shí)踐已內(nèi)嵌先發(fā)制人要素，現(xiàn)有規(guī)則亟待重新審視——聯(lián)合國秘書長近期收到的高級(jí)別專家組報(bào)告正印證此趨勢(shì)。
先發(fā)制人戰(zhàn)略建立在無法即時(shí)驗(yàn)證的假設(shè)之上：行動(dòng)窗口最大時(shí)，情報(bào)信息卻最為匱乏；待情報(bào)充分時(shí)，行動(dòng)窗口往往已關(guān)閉。若丘吉爾的預(yù)警被及時(shí)采納，納粹瘟疫本可以極低成本消滅。然而十年后，數(shù)千萬人因1930年代政治家對(duì)“確定性”的執(zhí)著追求而付出生命代價(jià)。
美國政策必須駕馭這種不確定性，核心命題在于如何界定威脅，以及通過何種機(jī)制實(shí)施反制。若各國自行定義先發(fā)制人權(quán)，規(guī)則缺失必將導(dǎo)致國際失序而非秩序。必須建立普世性原則與實(shí)施機(jī)制，否則將助長大規(guī)模殺傷性武器擴(kuò)散。
固然，美國與其他主權(quán)國家一樣，終將捍衛(wèi)其核心國家利益——必要時(shí)單方面行動(dòng)。但美國國家利益同樣要求推動(dòng)他國對(duì)國家利益的界定盡可能與其趨同。任何將國際秩序主要寄托于單邊優(yōu)勢(shì)武力的路徑，都將導(dǎo)向戰(zhàn)略透支的宿命。
首先需明確，美國戰(zhàn)略學(xué)說中的“先發(fā)制人”不同于傳統(tǒng)定義。傳統(tǒng)意義上的先發(fā)制人適用于已具備造成重大不可逆損害能力、且明確顯示即將發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊的對(duì)手。在此情形下的單邊動(dòng)武權(quán)已獲相當(dāng)程度認(rèn)可。當(dāng)前最顯見的適用對(duì)象是盤踞主權(quán)國家領(lǐng)土、具備傳統(tǒng)國家行為體威脅能力的恐怖組織。這類組織既無法威懾（因其無實(shí)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)可損毀），亦無法通過外交途徑解決（因其目標(biāo)非妥協(xié)而是消滅對(duì)手）。
戰(zhàn)略學(xué)說引發(fā)的根本性爭議在于“預(yù)防性使用武力”：即針對(duì)尚未迫在眉睫但未來可能形成壓倒性威脅的預(yù)防措施。需注意，預(yù)防性武力不適用于已確立的核大國。冷戰(zhàn)巔峰時(shí)期美國未對(duì)蘇聯(lián)核力量、深度敵對(duì)時(shí)期未對(duì)中國核計(jì)劃采取行動(dòng)，正說明除非核大國實(shí)際實(shí)施或即將實(shí)施侵略行為，否則不會(huì)觸發(fā)預(yù)防性打擊。
預(yù)防性武力問題折射國際體系的深層變革。威斯特伐利亞體系以邊界神圣不可侵犯為安全基石，而現(xiàn)代武器的威力、射程與速度已使這一定義過于狹隘。
當(dāng)前預(yù)防性外交的核心任務(wù)在于應(yīng)對(duì)新興擁核國家。美國有充分動(dòng)機(jī)阻止大規(guī)模殺傷性武器（特別是核武器）落入不當(dāng)主體。而新興大國動(dòng)機(jī)恰恰相反：加速獲取核武（受阻則發(fā)展生化武器），既為國家安全，亦為激進(jìn)政策提供保障。任何防擴(kuò)散外交成果都需為棄核國家提供安全保障。當(dāng)外交努力失敗時(shí)，預(yù)防性政策將面臨真正考驗(yàn)。
關(guān)于如何平衡此問題存在兩種學(xué)派：第一派認(rèn)為擴(kuò)散過程本身蘊(yùn)含致命危險(xiǎn)。該派指出，二戰(zhàn)前國家僅在遭受攻擊或面臨足以動(dòng)搖國際安全均勢(shì)的侵略時(shí)方可合法宣戰(zhàn)。但當(dāng)代權(quán)力要素已轉(zhuǎn)向技術(shù)而非領(lǐng)土。大規(guī)模殺傷性武器的存在本身即構(gòu)成力量倍增器，其威懾效應(yīng)在雙極核格局中尚可勉強(qiáng)維持，但隨著擁核國家增多，威懾機(jī)制將復(fù)雜至不可操作。因此必須將武力作為阻止核擴(kuò)散的最后手段。
另一思路則區(qū)分友好國家與敵對(duì)政權(quán)。美國默許印度、巴基斯坦、以色列發(fā)展核技術(shù)，因其目標(biāo)被認(rèn)為符合美國長期利益；強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)伊朗、朝鮮擁核，因其政權(quán)性質(zhì)與行為記錄構(gòu)成威脅。有觀點(diǎn)甚至主張最佳防擴(kuò)散政策就是顛覆朝伊政權(quán)。這暗示美國防擴(kuò)散政策更關(guān)注政權(quán)性質(zhì)而非擴(kuò)散事實(shí)。但明智戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到擴(kuò)散本身即構(gòu)成威脅，良性政府可緩解但無法消除這種威脅。
特殊情形是人道主義干預(yù)——僅間接威脅美國安全時(shí)，預(yù)防性武力需以捍衛(wèi)美國社會(huì)或國際社會(huì)核心價(jià)值為正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)。吊詭的是，此類干預(yù)沖動(dòng)在盧旺達(dá)、達(dá)爾富爾等種族滅絕事件中反而最難實(shí)施，因無國家感到直接威脅，導(dǎo)致單邊或多邊行動(dòng)均告闕如——這實(shí)為國際體系及其主導(dǎo)者的重大失職。
基于歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)可得出以下結(jié)論：戰(zhàn)略文件強(qiáng)調(diào)國際環(huán)境變遷及預(yù)防性戰(zhàn)略必要性確屬真知灼見。但理論闡述僅是第一步，必須將概念應(yīng)用于具體突發(fā)事件，從威脅、結(jié)果、后果多維度分析行動(dòng)方案。結(jié)論需超越政策聲明，形成可操作行動(dòng)計(jì)劃，并通過國會(huì)參與獲取可持續(xù)公眾支持。最后，預(yù)防性武力政策欲維系國際體系，必須確保美國的單邊行動(dòng)成為罕見例外而非戰(zhàn)略常態(tài)。
其他主要國家同樣肩負(fù)嚴(yán)肅責(zé)任：須正視新挑戰(zhàn)，避免將其視為美國專屬責(zé)任。盡管有違歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)，但構(gòu)建共同應(yīng)對(duì)機(jī)制或許可行——因?yàn)樗^“大國”已無通過軍事沖突獲益的空間。各國均深度依賴全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體系，均面臨意識(shí)形態(tài)與武器失控的威脅，均應(yīng)意識(shí)到：一旦爆發(fā)大規(guī)模殺傷性武器使用或文明沖突，民眾必將要求某種形式的預(yù)防性外交。真正的挑戰(zhàn)在于：如何在尚未經(jīng)歷災(zāi)難洗禮的情形下，構(gòu)建起有效的國際秩序。
三、英文
The recent publication of the second quadrennial administration statement on national strategy passed without the controversy that marked its predecessor in 2002. This is all the more remarkable because the statement reiterates the U.S. commitment to a strategy of preemption in exactly the same words contained in the 2002 version.
When the doctrine of preemption was first put forward, it was attacked as being contrary to generally accepted principles of the international system – principles that had evolved over three centuries and were enshrined in the United Nations Charter in 1945. Though the Charter provisions were ambiguous – Article 2 prohibits all use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of another state, and Article 51 recognizes a universal right of national self-defense – the legal framework worked well enough. Weapons of mass destruction spread relatively slowly, and the possibility of their being acquired by groups other than governments was yet beyond imagination. Hence the extension of the right of self-defense was widely rejected, because the rest of the international community did not accept a definition put forward by one country that reserved to itself the right to implement it.
This year’s report was received with less hostility, partly because other countries have more experience with the emerging threats and partly because a more conciliatory U.S. diplomacy has left new scope for consultation. It is being reluctantly recognized that preemption may be so built into modern technology and international practice that some reconsideration of existing rules is overdue, and a high-level group has reported to that effect to the U.N. secretary general.
Preemptive strategy is based on assumptions that cannot be proved when they are made. When the scope for action is greatest, knowledge is at a minimum. When knowledge has been acquired, the scope for preemption has often disappeared. Had Churchill’s early warning been heeded, the Nazi plague could have been destroyed at relatively little cost. A decade later, tens of millions had paid with their lives for the quest for certainty of statesmen of the 1930s.
American policy needs to navigate this element of uncertainty. The key question becomes: How is the threat to be defined, and through what institutions can resistance to it be implemented? If each nation claims the right to define its preemptive rights for itself, the absence of any rules would spell international chaos, not order. Some universal, generally accepted principles need to be matched with the machinery of their operation. Any other approach would create additional incentives for spreading weapons of mass destruction.
Of course, the United States, like any other sovereign nation, will in the end defend its vital national interests – if necessary, alone. But it also has a national interest in making the definition of national interest of other nations as much parallel to its own as possible. Any course that relies for international order primarily on unilateral superior force defines a trajectory toward doomed overextension.
A first step is to recognize that the American Strategic Doctrine does not really talk about what is commonly defined as preemptive action. Preemption applies to an adversary possessing a capacity to do great, potentially irreversible damage, coupled with the demonstrated will to do so imminently. The right to use force unilaterally in such circumstances has been more or less accepted. In that sense the most obvious targets for preemptive strategy are terrorist organizations operating from the territory of sovereign states and capable of generating threats that were heretofore an attribute of the nation state. These organizations cannot be deterred because they have nothing tangible to lose and because they have shadowy means to obscure the origin of their attack. Nor can they be dealt with by diplomacy, because their objective generally is not compromise but the destruction of their adversary.
The deeper issue raised by the administration’s Strategic Doctrine concerns what is generally defined as the preventive use of force: measures to forestall the emergence of a threat not yet imminent but capable, at some point in the future, of being potentially overwhelming.
It follows that preventive force is not an issue applicable to relations with an established major nuclear adversary. First-strike threats against established nuclear powers might, if such powers felt their weapons were very vulnerable, tempt them to make a preemptive strike of their own. If the United States did not act against the emerging Soviet nuclear power at the height of the Cold War or against that of China during the period of deep hostility, it is not likely to use force against an established nuclear power unless that power engages or is on the verge of engaging in actual aggression – conduct justifying preemption.
The issue of preventive force symbolizes the upheaval in the international system. The Westphalian system sought security based on the sanctity of international borders. In our time, the power, range and speed of modern weapons have made this definition too narrow.
Thus the issue of proliferation to states that until now have not had nuclear weapons emerges as one of the key tasks of preventive diplomacy. The United States has an obvious incentive to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially of nuclear weapons, into the wrong hands. For aspiring great powers, the incentive is precisely the opposite: to acquire nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and, if thwarted, to develop chemical or biological weapons – either for their own security or as a safety net for assertive or revolutionary policies. Any diplomatic outcome to the proliferation issue, therefore, depends in part on whether diplomacy is able to generate security assurances for the country asked to forgo nuclear weapons. The test of preventive policy will come if such efforts fail.
How should that balance be struck? One school of thought holds the view that mortal danger is inherent in the process of proliferation. It points out that, until the outbreak of World War II, a country could legitimately go to war if it was attacked or if an aggressor brought about a change in the global balance of power of a magnitude to threaten international security. But in the contemporary world, the coin of power is technology, not territory. Modern weapons of mass destruction, by their very existence, bring about an increase in a country’s power vastly exceeding what could be achieved by any conceivable territorial acquisition. The very existence of these weapons, according to this school of thought, produces a preemptive incentive; the balance of terror that was precariously maintained in a two-power nuclear world weakens with each new entrant into the ranks of states possessing weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence becomes impossibly complicated when many balances have to be considered by many different actors simultaneously. Hence, in this view, the emergence of nuclear weapons power must be prevented as a last resort by force.
Another approach makes a distinction between friendly and threatening countries. The United States has acquiesced in the development of nuclear weapons technology in India, Pakistan and Israel because the purpose of these states was believed compatible with long-range American objectives. The United States has strongly opposed the spread of weapons of mass destruction to Iran and North Korea because they are governed by hostile, autocratic regimes and have records of ruthless international conduct. Indeed, a not insignificant school of thought holds that the best anti-proliferation policy – at least in these cases – is to overthrow the North Korean and Iranian regimes. That implies America’s anti-proliferation policy is concerned not so much with the fact of proliferation as with the nature of the regime that acquires these weapons. Does this mean that America would acquiesce in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by elected governments? A realistic policy will bring a resolution to this debate and emphasize that a wise strategy will recognize the threat inherent in the very fact of proliferation, which can be mitigated but not ended by the existence of benevolent government.
A special case is humanitarian intervention, which applies to circumstances that threaten American security only indirectly. In these cases, the preventive use of force can be justified only on the ground that it resists offenses to values considered essential by American society or by the international community rather than to one’s security.
Strangely, the impulse towards preventive intervention has proved most difficult to apply to genocidal events like the massacres in Rwanda and Darfur. The fact that no country felt directly threatened prevented both unilateral and multilateral action – not to the credit of the international system or its principal exponents.
These earlier applications of preventive force suggest the following conclusions:
The analysis underlying the Strategic Doctrine document is correct in emphasizing the changes in the international environment and the propensity (or perhaps even necessity) they create toward some forms of preventive strategy. But stating the theory is only a first step. The concept must be applied to specific, concrete contingencies; courses of action need to be analyzed in terms not only of threats but of outcomes and consequences. Conclusions must go beyond position papers to plans of action capable of being carried out on the working level and include enough congressional participation to bring about sustainable public support. Finally, a policy that allows for preventive force can sustain the international system only if solitary American enterprises are the rare exception, not the basic rule of U.S. strategy.
The other major nations have a similar responsibility to take the new challenges seriously and to treat them as something beyond the sole responsibility of America. A common approach, however contrary to historical experience, may be possible because what used to be called the “great powers” have nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. They are all more or less dependent on the global economic system. They are all threatened if ideology and weapons run out of control. They should know that, after the use of weapons of mass destruction or universal carnage due to a clash of civilizations, their publics will demand some form of preventive diplomacy. The challenge is to build a viable international order without the impetus of having barely survived catastrophe.
四、譯文拾貝
Preemption strategy（先發(fā)制人戰(zhàn)略）
中文解釋：指國家在面臨明確且迫在眉睫的威脅時(shí)，采取主動(dòng)軍事行動(dòng)以消除威脅的戰(zhàn)略。該理論突破了傳統(tǒng)自衛(wèi)權(quán)的限制，強(qiáng)調(diào)在威脅形成前進(jìn)行打擊，其合法性存在國際爭議。
原文語境："the U.S. commitment to a strategy of preemption in exactly the same words contained in the 2002 version"
Doctrine of preemption（先發(fā)制人主義）
中文解釋：一種外交政策理論，主張國家有權(quán)在潛在威脅尚未轉(zhuǎn)化為實(shí)際攻擊前采取軍事行動(dòng)。該主義因可能被濫用為單邊主義工具而廣受批評(píng)，與《聯(lián)合國憲章》第 51 條自衛(wèi)權(quán)的“必要性”和“緊迫性”要求存在沖突。
原文語境："the doctrine of preemption was first put forward, it was attacked as being contrary to generally accepted principles"
United Nations Charter（《聯(lián)合國憲章》）
中文解釋：1945 年建立的國際組織基本法，確立了主權(quán)平等、禁止使用武力（第 2 條）、集體安全（第 7 章）和自衛(wèi)權(quán)（第 51 條）等核心原則，是現(xiàn)代國際法的基石。
原文語境："principles that had evolved over three centuries and were enshrined in the United Nations Charter in 1945"
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)（大規(guī)模殺傷性武器）
中文解釋：具有大規(guī)模殺傷能力的武器，包括核武器、生物武器和化學(xué)武器。其擴(kuò)散被視為對(duì)全球安全的重大威脅，受《不擴(kuò)散核武器條約》等國際機(jī)制管控。
原文語境："Weapons of mass destruction spread relatively slowly"
Right of national self-defense（國家自衛(wèi)權(quán)）
中文解釋：《聯(lián)合國憲章》第 51 條賦予國家在遭受武裝攻擊時(shí)采取必要自衛(wèi)措施的權(quán)利。國際法要求自衛(wèi)行動(dòng)需符合“必要性”和“比例性”原則，且需立即報(bào)告安理會(huì)。
原文語境："Article 51 recognizes a universal right of national self-defense"
International system principles（國際體系原則）
中文解釋：指威斯特伐利亞體系以來形成的主權(quán)平等、不干涉內(nèi)政、和平解決爭端等基本原則，構(gòu)成現(xiàn)代國際關(guān)系的規(guī)范基礎(chǔ)。
原文語境："contrary to generally accepted principles of the international system"
Preventive use of force（預(yù)防性使用武力）
中文解釋：針對(duì)未來可能構(gòu)成威脅的潛在能力使用武力，其威脅尚未達(dá)到“迫在眉睫”的程度。該行為缺乏明確國際法依據(jù)，易引發(fā)對(duì)濫用武力的擔(dān)憂。
原文語境："what is generally defined as the preventive use of force"
Balance of terror（恐怖平衡）
中文解釋：核威懾理論中的核心概念，指兩個(gè)核大國因相互確保摧毀（MAD）而形成的脆弱穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)。該平衡隨核武器擴(kuò)散而削弱。
原文語境："the balance of terror that was precariously maintained in a two-power nuclear world"
Westphalian system（威斯特伐利亞體系）
中文解釋：1648 年《威斯特伐利亞和約》確立的主權(quán)國家體系，以領(lǐng)土主權(quán)、不干涉內(nèi)政和均勢(shì)原則為特征，奠定了現(xiàn)代國際關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)。
原文語境："The Westphalian system sought security based on the sanctity of international borders"
Proliferation of nuclear weapons（核武器擴(kuò)散）
中文解釋：核武器技術(shù)和材料向非核國家傳播的現(xiàn)象。國際社會(huì)通過《不擴(kuò)散核武器條約》（NPT）等機(jī)制遏制擴(kuò)散，但印度、巴基斯坦等國的核計(jì)劃對(duì)該體系構(gòu)成挑戰(zhàn)。
原文語境："the issue of proliferation to states that until now have not had nuclear weapons"
Diplomatic outcome（外交成果）
中文解釋：通過談判達(dá)成的政治協(xié)議或共識(shí)，常涉及安全、經(jīng)濟(jì)等領(lǐng)域。成功的外交成果需兼顧各方核心利益，如伊朗核協(xié)議（JCPOA）。
原文語境："Any diplomatic outcome to the proliferation issue"
Security assurances（安全保證）
中文解釋：大國向無核國家提供的不使用核武器的承諾，旨在換取其放棄核計(jì)劃。例如，美國對(duì)無核國家的“消極安全保證”（NSA）。
原文語境："generate security assurances for the country asked to forgo nuclear weapons"
Deterrence theory（威懾理論）
中文解釋：通過展示報(bào)復(fù)能力阻止對(duì)手攻擊的戰(zhàn)略理論。核威懾依賴“可信威脅”，但對(duì)非國家行為體（如恐怖組織）可能失效。
原文語境："Deterrence becomes impossibly complicated when many balances have to be considered"
Humanitarian intervention（人道主義干預(yù)）
中文解釋：為防止大規(guī)模人權(quán)侵犯（如種族滅絕）而對(duì)主權(quán)國家進(jìn)行的軍事干預(yù)。其合法性存在爭議，需符合“保護(hù)的責(zé)任”（R2P）原則。
原文語境："A special case is humanitarian intervention"
Genocidal events（種族滅絕事件）
中文解釋：有組織、有計(jì)劃地消滅特定民族、種族或宗教群體的行為。國際社會(huì)有責(zé)任根據(jù)《防止及懲治滅絕種族罪公約》采取行動(dòng)。
原文語境："preventive intervention has proved most difficult to apply to genocidal events"
Unilateral superior force（單邊優(yōu)勢(shì)武力）
中文解釋：依賴軍事優(yōu)勢(shì)單獨(dú)采取行動(dòng)的外交政策，可能導(dǎo)致國際秩序失衡。美國 2003 年入侵伊拉克被視為單邊主義典型案例。
原文語境："relies for international order primarily on unilateral superior force"
Strategic Doctrine（戰(zhàn)略學(xué)說）
中文解釋：國家對(duì)安全威脅和應(yīng)對(duì)策略的系統(tǒng)闡述，如美國的《國家安全戰(zhàn)略》。其內(nèi)容反映國家利益和國際環(huán)境變化。
原文語境："the American Strategic Doctrine does not really talk about preemptive action"
Mortal danger（致命危險(xiǎn)）
中文解釋：對(duì)國家生存構(gòu)成直接威脅的情形。根據(jù)國際法，國家在面臨“生死存亡”危機(jī)時(shí)可采取超常規(guī)自衛(wèi)措施。
原文語境："mortal danger is inherent in the process of proliferation"
First-strike threats（先發(fā)制人打擊威脅）
中文解釋：對(duì)敵方核力量實(shí)施首次打擊的能力。該威脅可能引發(fā)“先制攻擊”（Preemptive attack），加劇核對(duì)抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
原文語境："First-strike threats against established nuclear powers"
Revolutionary policies（革命性政策）
中文解釋：旨在顛覆現(xiàn)有國際秩序的激進(jìn)外交政策，常與意識(shí)形態(tài)輸出相關(guān)。伊朗伊斯蘭革命后的反美政策是典型案例。
原文語境："as a safety net for assertive or revolutionary policies"
Global balance of power（全球權(quán)力平衡）
中文解釋：國際體系中主要國家間的力量分配狀態(tài)。均勢(shì)理論認(rèn)為，權(quán)力平衡可防止霸權(quán)擴(kuò)張，維護(hù)國際穩(wěn)定。
原文語境："threaten international security by altering the global balance of power"
Shadowy means（隱蔽手段）
中文解釋：非國家行為體（如恐怖組織）使用的匿名化攻擊方式，如自殺式襲擊、網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊等，增加溯源難度。
原文語境："they have shadowy means to obscure the origin of their attack"
Unilateral action（單邊行動(dòng)）
中文解釋：國家未經(jīng)國際授權(quán)單獨(dú)采取的軍事或外交行動(dòng)。其合法性常受質(zhì)疑，如美國退出《中導(dǎo)條約》。
原文語境："prevented both unilateral and multilateral action"
Multilateral action（多邊行動(dòng)）
中文解釋：通過國際組織或多國聯(lián)盟協(xié)調(diào)的集體行動(dòng)，如聯(lián)合國維和行動(dòng)。其有效性依賴成員國共識(shí)。
原文語境："prevented both unilateral and multilateral action"
International chaos（國際混亂）
中文解釋：缺乏有效國際規(guī)則和治理機(jī)制導(dǎo)致的無序狀態(tài)。單邊主義和軍備競(jìng)賽可能加劇混亂風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
原文語境："the absence of any rules would spell international chaos"
Terrorist organizations（恐怖組織）
中文解釋：以暴力手段實(shí)現(xiàn)政治目標(biāo)的非國家行為體，如基地組織、伊斯蘭國。其跨國活動(dòng)對(duì)傳統(tǒng)國家安全構(gòu)成新挑戰(zhàn)。
原文語境："the most obvious targets for preemptive strategy are terrorist organizations"
Sovereign states（主權(quán)國家）
中文解釋：擁有獨(dú)立主權(quán)、領(lǐng)土完整和政府機(jī)構(gòu)的政治實(shí)體，是威斯特伐利亞體系的核心單位。
原文語境："operating from the territory of sovereign states"
Irreversible damage（不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的損害）
中文解釋：造成無法修復(fù)的后果，如核污染、生態(tài)災(zāi)難。先發(fā)制人戰(zhàn)略旨在避免此類損害。
原文語境："capacity to do great, potentially irreversible damage"
Diplomatic compromise（外交妥協(xié)）
中文解釋：通過談判達(dá)成雙方利益平衡的解決方案。伊朗核協(xié)議要求伊朗限制核計(jì)劃以換取制裁解除，是典型妥協(xié)案例。
原文語境："their objective generally is not compromise but destruction"
Nuclear adversary（核對(duì)手）
中文解釋：擁有核武器并構(gòu)成戰(zhàn)略威脅的國家。冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期美蘇互為核對(duì)手，當(dāng)前美國將俄羅斯、中國視為主要核對(duì)手。
原文語境："preventive force is not applicable to established major nuclear adversary"
Actual aggression（實(shí)際侵略行為）
中文解釋：違反《聯(lián)合國憲章》使用武力的行為，如軍事入侵。只有在此情況下，先發(fā)制人行動(dòng)才被部分國際法學(xué)者視為合法。
原文語境："unless engaging in actual aggression justifying preemption"
Preventive diplomacy（預(yù)防性外交）
中文解釋：通過外交手段防止沖突發(fā)生或升級(jí)的策略，如調(diào)解、斡旋和建立信任措施。聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)常采用該手段。
原文語境："one of the key tasks of preventive diplomacy"
Aspiring great powers（新興大國）
中文解釋：經(jīng)濟(jì)、軍事力量快速增長并尋求國際影響力的國家，如印度、巴西。其崛起可能改變現(xiàn)有國際秩序。
原文語境："For aspiring great powers, the incentive is precisely the opposite"
Chemical or biological weapons（化學(xué)或生物武器）
中文解釋：利用有毒化學(xué)物質(zhì)或病原體制造的武器，被《禁止化學(xué)武器公約》《生物武器公約》明令禁止。
原文語境："develop chemical or biological weapons"
Security net（安全網(wǎng)）
中文解釋：為應(yīng)對(duì)潛在威脅而建立的保障機(jī)制，如軍事聯(lián)盟、核威懾。新興國家可能將獲取WMD視為自身安全網(wǎng)。
原文語境："as a safety net for assertive policies"
Benevolent government（仁慈政府）
中文解釋：以公共福祉為目標(biāo)的政府，常與民主制度相關(guān)。但即使此類政府擁有 WMD，仍可能引發(fā)安全擔(dān)憂。
原文語境："mitigated by the existence of benevolent government"
Anti-proliferation policy（防擴(kuò)散政策）
中文解釋：阻止大規(guī)模殺傷性武器擴(kuò)散的國家或國際政策，包括外交談判、制裁和軍事打擊等手段。
原文語境："America’s anti-proliferation policy is concerned"
Ruthless international conduct（冷酷的國際行為）
中文解釋：無視國際法和人道主義原則的行為，如支持恐怖主義、侵犯人權(quán)。伊朗和朝鮮被美國指控存在此類行為。
原文語境："hostile regimes with records of ruthless international conduct"
Overthrow of regimes（政權(quán)更迭）
中文解釋：通過軍事干預(yù)或支持反對(duì)派改變他國政權(quán)的行為。美國在阿富汗、伊拉克的行動(dòng)被批評(píng)為“政權(quán)更迭”政策。
原文語境："implies overthrowing the North Korean and Iranian regimes"
Elected governments（民選政府）
中文解釋：通過自由公正選舉產(chǎn)生的政府。美國對(duì)民選政府獲取核武器的態(tài)度可能不同于專制政權(quán)。
原文語境："acquisition of nuclear weapons by elected governments"
Sustainable public support（可持續(xù)的公眾支持）
中文解釋：長期維持的國內(nèi)民眾對(duì)政策的認(rèn)同。美國的預(yù)防性戰(zhàn)略需國會(huì)參與以確保公眾支持的持續(xù)性。
原文語境："include enough congressional participation to bring about sustainable public support"
Working-level plans（工作層面計(jì)劃）
中文解釋：具體實(shí)施的操作性方案，區(qū)別于宏觀戰(zhàn)略文件。需明確步驟、責(zé)任人和資源分配。
原文語境："plans of action capable of being carried out on the working level"
Solitary American enterprises（美國單獨(dú)行動(dòng)）
中文解釋：美國獨(dú)自實(shí)施的軍事或外交行動(dòng)。過度依賴單邊行動(dòng)可能削弱其國際合法性。
原文語境："solitary American enterprises are the rare exception"
Global economic system（全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體系）
中文解釋：由國際貿(mào)易、金融和投資構(gòu)成的相互依存網(wǎng)絡(luò)。大國沖突可能導(dǎo)致該體系崩潰，威脅各國利益。
原文語境："dependent on the global economic system"
Clash of civilizations（文明沖突）
中文解釋：亨廷頓提出的理論，認(rèn)為冷戰(zhàn)后的國際沖突主要源于不同文明間的文化差異。該理論常被用于解釋伊斯蘭極端主義與西方的對(duì)立。
原文語境："universal carnage due to a clash of civilizations"
Viable international order（可行的國際秩序）
中文解釋：能夠平衡各國利益、有效應(yīng)對(duì)全球挑戰(zhàn)的國際治理體系。當(dāng)前多極化趨勢(shì)要求秩序更具包容性。
原文語境："build a viable international order without catastrophe"
Catastrophic impetus（災(zāi)難性推動(dòng)力）
中文解釋：重大危機(jī)（如核戰(zhàn)爭）迫使國際社會(huì)合作的動(dòng)力。人類需在危機(jī)前主動(dòng)構(gòu)建秩序，而非依賴災(zāi)難推動(dòng)。
原文語境："without the impetus of having barely survived catastrophe"
Great power responsibilities（大國責(zé)任）
中文解釋：國際體系中主要國家對(duì)維護(hù)和平與安全的特殊義務(wù)，包括提供公共產(chǎn)品、遵守國際規(guī)則等。
原文語境："other major nations have a similar responsibility"
大外交青年智庫（簡稱“大外交智庫”）（Glory Diplomacy Youth Think-tank，Glory Diplomacy或GDYT）是一家創(chuàng)辦于2017年的以外交安全為主的綜合性戰(zhàn)略研究機(jī)構(gòu)、社會(huì)/青年智庫，總部在中國深圳，是深圳首家非官方外交安全智庫、中國首家青年智庫，創(chuàng)始人是王蓋蓋。GDYT一直堅(jiān)持“只有修煉好內(nèi)功，才能放心去實(shí)戰(zhàn)”的發(fā)展理念，從2017年創(chuàng)始初期穩(wěn)扎穩(wěn)打，于2018年成立青年原創(chuàng)評(píng)論組（于2022年改組為《智本青析》編輯部）并創(chuàng)辦《智本青析》電子刊至今；2019年在海南開設(shè)分支機(jī)構(gòu)即海南大外交學(xué)會(huì)（GDYT HN），同年成立青年發(fā)展研究院，該中心在2019年創(chuàng)辦“大外交青年發(fā)展與實(shí)踐啟航項(xiàng)目”研修班至今，在2021年創(chuàng)辦“世界青年菁英坊《早點(diǎn)知道》講座項(xiàng)目”至今；2020年成立應(yīng)試就業(yè)研究院并創(chuàng)辦《真題解析》付費(fèi)專欄；同年7月，成立外交外事涉外安全決策咨詢公司，集中研究國家安全與國際安全、海外利益分析與保護(hù)、青年外交與青年發(fā)展、區(qū)域國別與國際組織、跨國公司與全球治理等事務(wù)；2021年成立外文編譯評(píng)議組并創(chuàng)辦《大譯編參》電子刊至今（該編輯部于2022年創(chuàng)辦《每日信報(bào)》微電子日刊），同年成立區(qū)域國別研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《新國別簡報(bào)》欄目）；2022年成立世界外交數(shù)據(jù)中心、全球治理研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《鴻士論天下》欄目）、國家安全研究院、黨的理論創(chuàng)新研究中心，并合并所有專訪項(xiàng)目（青坊談、最有影響力人物訪談、21世紀(jì)中國外交天團(tuán)、學(xué)人專訪等）整合為《與名人對(duì)話》欄目，組建“青年智庫特種部隊(duì)”全職高精尖部門（該部門于2023年創(chuàng)辦《中華內(nèi)參》內(nèi)刊）和全球范圍內(nèi)的“大中華菁英圈”（該共同體于2024年創(chuàng)辦《全球統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)》內(nèi)刊），開啟“Smallibrary·小書屋”全球青年閱讀挑戰(zhàn)計(jì)劃（該計(jì)劃于2022年創(chuàng)辦《智庫書屋》欄目），運(yùn)營新知太學(xué)（網(wǎng)絡(luò)）書院（該書院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《線上共讀》欄目）；2023年，成立全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、全球?yàn)硡^(qū)研究院、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心、數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院、海洋治理研究中心、基式外交研究中心，在香港開設(shè)分支機(jī)構(gòu)“香港大外交學(xué)會(huì)（GDYT HK）”，創(chuàng)辦“華灣國際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”國際人才交流平臺(tái)，創(chuàng)辦“灣山友（WSY）”戶外爬山徒步讀書研討國際精英俱樂部；2024年，成立新型智庫研究院、企業(yè)出海研究院（整合全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心等三大中心于一體）、“荔林讀書會(huì)（LOC）”（整合“國關(guān)讀書會(huì)”“華灣讀書會(huì)”“灣山友讀書會(huì)”“全球4%讀書會(huì)”等四大讀書會(huì)于一體）等。GDYT從2021年以來，多次舉辦全國（含全球）青年國際問題學(xué)術(shù)研討、思想交流、政策分析與企業(yè)出海等活動(dòng)，如“國際問題研究型青年智庫發(fā)展模式探索論壇”、“新型國際問題青年智庫建設(shè)與發(fā)展論壇”、“國際關(guān)系青年辯論賽”、“國際關(guān)系青年辯論賽最佳辯手論壇”、“世界青年菁英坊《早點(diǎn)知道》系列講座”、“國際問題/區(qū)域國別學(xué)術(shù)研討會(huì)（GDYT·ISAS）”系列活動(dòng)、“《與名人對(duì)話》系列采訪活動(dòng)”、“《鴻士論天下》系列講座活動(dòng)”、“新時(shí)代中國國際戰(zhàn)略高端論壇與菁英論壇”、“華灣國際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”系列活動(dòng)、“GDYT與國際知名學(xué)者對(duì)話”、“灣山友俱樂部粵港澳國際精英戶外實(shí)踐交流”系列活動(dòng)、“荔林讀書會(huì)”國際前沿思想沙龍等等。自創(chuàng)辦以來，GDYT一直致力于“讓壹億中國大外交青年智慧與方案被全球看見”，聚集全球各地有志青年為實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人、企業(yè)、社會(huì)、國家和世界和平發(fā)展而奮斗，至2021年底，已發(fā)展成集專家顧問、研究員（含高級(jí)）、特約研究員（含高級(jí)）、助理研究員、編譯評(píng)議員、時(shí)政評(píng)論員、實(shí)習(xí)生、志愿者等全方位國際人才體系（200人）的樣本標(biāo)桿青年智庫，聚焦中國與全球大外交領(lǐng)域青年的原創(chuàng)方案、發(fā)展計(jì)劃和外交延伸等助力與服務(wù)，在“對(duì)照全球外交發(fā)展、對(duì)接世界高端智庫、對(duì)比新型平臺(tái)建設(shè)”的三原則指導(dǎo)下，為中國的外交與安全發(fā)展貢獻(xiàn)青年力量和方案，為中央及地方政府部門提供內(nèi)參、為企業(yè)國內(nèi)外發(fā)展提供商業(yè)咨詢、為國際問題智庫建設(shè)提供調(diào)研路徑、為非政府組織及個(gè)人提供咨詢等服務(wù)，被海內(nèi)外青年譽(yù)為現(xiàn)代智囊的“青年精英大腦集中營、集散地”，是全球新型外交青年智庫的開創(chuàng)者和代言人！
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