大外交青年智庫(kù)·深圳
Glory Diplomacy
讓中國(guó)外交青年智慧被全球看見(jiàn)
為中國(guó)青年智庫(kù)代言
大外交青年智庫(kù)基式外交研究中心
作者：亨利?A?基辛格
譯者：大外交青年智庫(kù)基式外交研究中心
來(lái)源：《基式外交研究》2025年第19期“經(jīng)典文獻(xiàn)重譯”專欄文章
審定：基式外交研究中心學(xué)術(shù)委員會(huì)
文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy." The Washington Post, May 16, 2006.
聲明：基式外交研究中心轉(zhuǎn)載、編譯與翻譯的內(nèi)容均為非商業(yè)性引用（學(xué)術(shù)研究），不作商用，版權(quán)歸原作者所有。如有問(wèn)題請(qǐng)即刻聯(lián)系，如需轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處
郵箱：fydwjzhuanyong@126.com
一、摘要
基辛格指出，伊朗總統(tǒng)致信事件需從戰(zhàn)略與戰(zhàn)術(shù)雙重維度解讀：既可能是規(guī)避國(guó)際審查的政治操弄，亦或?yàn)閲?guó)內(nèi)激進(jìn)勢(shì)力適應(yīng)對(duì)美對(duì)話鋪路。當(dāng)前朝核與伊核談判面臨歷史性轉(zhuǎn)折，若外交失敗，世界將被迫在武力干預(yù)與核秩序崩潰間抉擇。朝核六方會(huì)談雖具框架但陷入僵局，朝鮮以拖延戰(zhàn)術(shù)換取核武庫(kù)建設(shè)時(shí)間；伊核問(wèn)題更嚴(yán)峻，國(guó)際社會(huì)甚至未就談判目標(biāo)達(dá)成共識(shí)?；粮駨?qiáng)調(diào)，美國(guó)需直接參與多邊機(jī)制（而非依賴代理人），整合中俄歐等關(guān)鍵方，構(gòu)建更具約束力的談判框架。他警告，放任僵局將引發(fā)全球核擴(kuò)散連鎖反應(yīng)：韓日、中東多國(guó)或效仿?lián)砗?，激進(jìn)勢(shì)力借核威懾?cái)U(kuò)大全球影響力。針對(duì)談判策略，基辛格主張區(qū)分“政權(quán)更迭”與“去核化”，效仿冷戰(zhàn)遏制政策：不挑戰(zhàn)對(duì)手政權(quán)安全，但堅(jiān)決抵制其對(duì)外擴(kuò)張，同時(shí)以安全經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)償換取棄核。他呼吁明確談判時(shí)限，彌合情報(bào)評(píng)估差距，并在窮盡外交手段后保留武力選項(xiàng)。文章警示，當(dāng)前局勢(shì)堪比1938年與冷戰(zhàn)初期——國(guó)際社會(huì)的猶疑可能導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難，唯有凝聚共識(shí)、直面挑戰(zhàn)，方能避免核災(zāi)難，重現(xiàn)二戰(zhàn)后“不戰(zhàn)而勝”的智慧。
二、中文
伊朗總統(tǒng)馬哈茂德?艾哈邁迪內(nèi)賈德近期致信布什總統(tǒng)，需從多個(gè)層面審視。首先，這封信可被視為旨在阻撓聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)審議伊朗違反《不擴(kuò)散核武器條約》義務(wù)的策略性舉動(dòng)?；诖丝剂?，加之信中充斥的煽動(dòng)性措辭，國(guó)務(wù)卿康多莉扎?賴斯對(duì)該信件的斷然拒絕實(shí)屬合宜。但值得深思的是，這封時(shí)隔25年來(lái)伊朗領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人首次直接致函美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的信件，或許隱含著超越戰(zhàn)術(shù)操弄與政治宣傳的深層意圖——其激進(jìn)口吻可能是為讓伊朗國(guó)內(nèi)激進(jìn)勢(shì)力逐步適應(yīng)與美國(guó)的對(duì)話機(jī)制。面對(duì)當(dāng)今世界最具決定性意義的核擴(kuò)散挑戰(zhàn)，美國(guó)亟需確立清晰連貫的戰(zhàn)略框架與政策目標(biāo)。
國(guó)際社會(huì)正面臨一個(gè)令人不寒而栗的前景：核武器可能演變?yōu)閲?guó)家常規(guī)軍備的標(biāo)配，并最終落入恐怖組織之手。當(dāng)前圍繞朝鮮與伊朗核擴(kuò)散問(wèn)題的談判具有分水嶺意義。一旦外交努力失敗，國(guó)際社會(huì)將被迫在兩種災(zāi)難性選項(xiàng)間抉擇：要么訴諸武力干預(yù)，要么接受一個(gè)核約束機(jī)制全面崩潰的世界——那些本應(yīng)最積極維護(hù)核秩序的核大國(guó)，卻因自身的無(wú)能或懈怠，任由違逆國(guó)際準(zhǔn)則的極端主義者瓦解核不擴(kuò)散體系。只需試想：若紐約、華盛頓、倫敦、馬德里、伊斯坦布爾或巴厘島遭遇的恐怖襲擊中，哪怕僅使用最原始的核裝置，其后果都將不堪設(shè)想。
在朝鮮與伊朗兩大核談判進(jìn)程中，由日、韓、中、美、俄及朝方參與的六方會(huì)談機(jī)制，較之英法德三國(guó)與伊朗的四國(guó)對(duì)話框架更為成熟。去年九月在北京達(dá)成的原則性協(xié)議曾顯露曙光：朝鮮承諾放棄核計(jì)劃，以換取各方提供安全保障、后核化時(shí)代經(jīng)濟(jì)援助，以及替代核能發(fā)電的技術(shù)支持。但現(xiàn)實(shí)困境在于，朝方堅(jiān)持要求其他締約方先行履行全部義務(wù)，而自身卻采取拖延戰(zhàn)術(shù)——通過(guò)拉長(zhǎng)各輪會(huì)談間隔期為核武庫(kù)建設(shè)爭(zhēng)取時(shí)間，致使同步推進(jìn)的談判路線圖始終未能建立。
伊朗核問(wèn)題則更為棘手，國(guó)際社會(huì)迄今尚未就談判目標(biāo)達(dá)成基本共識(shí)。德黑蘭始終拒絕接受對(duì)其鈾濃縮計(jì)劃的國(guó)際監(jiān)管，而缺失這一前提，任何針對(duì)核武器計(jì)劃的管控措施都將形同虛設(shè)。
當(dāng)前輿論焦點(diǎn)多集中于美國(guó)是否應(yīng)與朝伊展開雙邊對(duì)話。就朝鮮問(wèn)題而言，這實(shí)為次要議題。六方會(huì)談機(jī)制已為美朝雙邊意見(jiàn)交換提供了充分平臺(tái)。平壤當(dāng)局的真正意圖——也是布什政府明智抵制的關(guān)鍵——在于尋求繞開多邊框架的美朝單獨(dú)談判，此舉將導(dǎo)致其他參與方規(guī)避共同責(zé)任。若雙邊談判取代六方機(jī)制，美國(guó)的現(xiàn)有合作伙伴可能將打破僵局的責(zé)任悉數(shù)轉(zhuǎn)嫁華盛頓，使美國(guó)陷入外交孤立。
這一邏輯在伊朗問(wèn)題上體現(xiàn)得更為顯著。歷史積怨（如人質(zhì)危機(jī)）、伊朗對(duì)恐怖組織的支持及其總統(tǒng)的挑釁性言論，始終是多邊正式談判的主要障礙。即便伊朗總統(tǒng)此次致信，亦未真正消除這些結(jié)構(gòu)性矛盾。然而，鑒于核危機(jī)對(duì)美國(guó)安全的直接威脅，華盛頓不應(yīng)僅通過(guò)代理人（即便是親密盟友）開展談判。既然美國(guó)能在六方框架內(nèi)與朝鮮磋商核擴(kuò)散問(wèn)題，亦能在巴格達(dá)就伊拉克安全議題與伊朗對(duì)話，完全有能力構(gòu)建一個(gè)容納美國(guó)直接參與的對(duì)伊核問(wèn)題多邊談判機(jī)制——特別是考慮到當(dāng)前局勢(shì)的極端危險(xiǎn)性。
談判僵局的持續(xù)將意味著國(guó)際社會(huì)對(duì)核俱樂(lè)部擴(kuò)員的默許。在亞洲，韓日兩國(guó)幾乎必然跟進(jìn)擁核；中東地區(qū)的土耳其、埃及乃至沙特亦可能效仿。屆時(shí)，所有重要工業(yè)國(guó)都將視核武為國(guó)家地位的必備象征。而激進(jìn)勢(shì)力在全球——特別是伊斯蘭世界——的影響力，將因其成功挑戰(zhàn)核大國(guó)的權(quán)威而空前增強(qiáng)。
管理一個(gè)核武遍布的世界，其復(fù)雜程度遠(yuǎn)超冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期兩個(gè)超級(jí)大國(guó)的核威懾平衡。新興核國(guó)家不僅需要與對(duì)手建立威懾平衡（這一過(guò)程未必遵循現(xiàn)有核國(guó)家數(shù)十年形成的規(guī)范），更可能宣稱對(duì)各類國(guó)際對(duì)抗擁有“合法關(guān)切”。尤其是伊朗及其潛在追隨者，將得以利用核武庫(kù)為其全球革命活動(dòng)提供戰(zhàn)略保護(hù)。
存在一種為核擴(kuò)散開脫的論調(diào)，認(rèn)為新興核國(guó)家在歷史上曾展現(xiàn)克制。但歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)并不支持這種觀點(diǎn)：巴基斯坦通過(guò)A·Q·汗項(xiàng)目擴(kuò)散核技術(shù)；朝鮮更是核擴(kuò)散的活躍推手。此外，新興核國(guó)家的核材料安保體系必然存在更多漏洞，技術(shù)水平亦相對(duì)落后。
外交進(jìn)程亟需新動(dòng)力。首要任務(wù)是，美國(guó)及其談判伙伴需就談判時(shí)限達(dá)成共識(shí)。普遍評(píng)估認(rèn)為，平壤每年可生產(chǎn)供數(shù)枚核彈使用的钚材料，盡管對(duì)其實(shí)戰(zhàn)化核武器研發(fā)進(jìn)度存在分歧。對(duì)德黑蘭首枚核武器問(wèn)世時(shí)間的預(yù)測(cè)則在2至10年間浮動(dòng)。鑒于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與代價(jià)的嚴(yán)重性，這種評(píng)估差異必須盡快彌合。此外，2008年美俄兩國(guó)政府更迭可能造成的外交空窗期，亦需納入談判節(jié)奏的考量。
其次需明確多邊談判與政權(quán)更迭戰(zhàn)略的本質(zhì)區(qū)別。無(wú)可否認(rèn)，若平壤與德黑蘭現(xiàn)政權(quán)被負(fù)責(zé)任的政府取代，將極大促進(jìn)國(guó)際和平與安全。但現(xiàn)有及潛在談判參與方無(wú)一會(huì)公開支持以政權(quán)更迭為目標(biāo)的政策。核裁軍談判必然涉及以安全保證與經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)償換取棄核承諾，這與政權(quán)更迭訴求存在根本性矛盾。
將去核化與政權(quán)更迭混為一談只會(huì)模糊焦點(diǎn)。無(wú)論朝鮮與伊朗由何種政權(quán)執(zhí)政，美國(guó)都應(yīng)堅(jiān)決反對(duì)其擁核行為。
有效的去核化外交策略應(yīng)效仿冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期成功的遏制政策：不對(duì)對(duì)手的外部安全構(gòu)成先發(fā)制人式的挑戰(zhàn)，但堅(jiān)決抵制其對(duì)外擴(kuò)張企圖，同時(shí)依靠?jī)?nèi)部力量促成變革。正是這種精細(xì)平衡的戰(zhàn)略思維，使得里根總統(tǒng)在將蘇聯(lián)稱為“邪惡帝國(guó)”數(shù)周后，仍向勃列日涅夫發(fā)出對(duì)話邀請(qǐng)。
解決朝核問(wèn)題需要就朝鮮半島及東北亞政治演進(jìn)達(dá)成戰(zhàn)略共識(shí)。國(guó)際社會(huì)曾期待中國(guó)出于對(duì)朝核問(wèn)題（及由此可能引發(fā)的日本核武裝）的深度關(guān)切，終將對(duì)平壤施加必要壓力。但這一預(yù)期至今未能實(shí)現(xiàn)，因中國(guó)在半島問(wèn)題上的考量兼具軍事安全與地緣戰(zhàn)略維度：北京將竭力避免朝鮮政權(quán)突然崩潰導(dǎo)致的難民潮與邊境動(dòng)蕩。因此，對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略對(duì)話必須成為談判戰(zhàn)略的重要組成部分，同時(shí)需回應(yīng)平壤的安全關(guān)切。
盡管美國(guó)在六方會(huì)談中派出克里斯托弗·希爾這樣的杰出外交官，但仍需更高層級(jí)的定期介入以把握戰(zhàn)略方向。談判目標(biāo)應(yīng)是建立東北亞安全與政治演進(jìn)框架：在去核化進(jìn)程中不涉及主權(quán)變更，同時(shí)為通過(guò)談判或內(nèi)部演進(jìn)實(shí)現(xiàn)朝鮮統(tǒng)一保留可能性。
相似原則適用于伊朗問(wèn)題。現(xiàn)行談判機(jī)制存在嚴(yán)重缺陷：英法德三國(guó)作為美國(guó)代理人開展談判，中俄僅在北約將問(wèn)題提交安理會(huì)時(shí)介入——這種安排使德黑蘭得以在核大國(guó)間實(shí)施離間策略。
更有效的談判框架應(yīng)將歐洲三國(guó)與美中俄整合，作為受直接影響最深、且最具安理會(huì)聯(lián)合行動(dòng)能力的核心談判方。這一機(jī)制可在當(dāng)前安理會(huì)決議通過(guò)后建立，用于推進(jìn)俄羅斯提出的“境外鈾濃縮”方案——將部分鈾濃縮活動(dòng)轉(zhuǎn)移至俄境內(nèi)，防止伊朗秘密研發(fā)核武器。新機(jī)制還可為未來(lái)核技術(shù)建立國(guó)際管控標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，遏制核擴(kuò)散陰云。
顯然，僅靠增設(shè)談判機(jī)制無(wú)法阻止核擴(kuò)散?，F(xiàn)有談判進(jìn)程已暴露出拖延與混淆視聽(tīng)的巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。有效外交必須包含對(duì)蓄意阻撓行為實(shí)施明確制裁的意志。
唯有在建立必要談判框架并窮盡所有外交手段后，方可考慮軍事選項(xiàng)。但同樣重要的是，在尚未明確何種情形需要啟動(dòng)最后手段前，不應(yīng)在原則上永久排除使用武力的可能。
當(dāng)前國(guó)際社會(huì)面臨的考驗(yàn)，與1938年及冷戰(zhàn)初期的歷史抉擇驚人相似：能否克服恐懼與猶疑，走上形勢(shì)所需的艱難道路。1938年的失敗引發(fā)了災(zāi)難性戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)；而二戰(zhàn)后成功應(yīng)對(duì)挑戰(zhàn)則帶來(lái)了不戰(zhàn)而勝的結(jié)局。
圍繞這些議題的辯論將貫穿美國(guó)政府任期尾聲。表面看來(lái)，這可能加劇黨派紛爭(zhēng)。但兩黨有識(shí)之士都應(yīng)意識(shí)到，當(dāng)前決策的后果將由新政府承擔(dān)?；蛟S，這個(gè)足以毀滅人類的核問(wèn)題，最終能促使美國(guó)凝聚共識(shí)。這，正是我們共同的希望所在。
三、英文
The recent letter from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to President Bush needs to be considered on several levels. It can be treated as a ploy to obstruct U.N. Security Council deliberations on Iran's disregard of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This consideration, and the demagogic tone of the letter, merited its rejection by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. But the first direct approach by an Iranian leader to a U.S. president in more than 25 years may also have intentions beyond the tactical and propagandistic, and its demagoguery may be a way to get the radical part of the Iranian public used to dialogue with the United States. America's challenge is to define its own strategy and purposes regarding the most fateful issue confronting us today.
The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national armament and wind up in terrorist hands. The negotiations on Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation mark a watershed. A failed diplomacy would leave us with a choice between the use of force or a world where restraint has been eroded by the inability or unwillingness of countries that have the most to lose to restrain defiant fanatics. One need only imagine what would have happened had any of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, London, Madrid, Istanbul or Bali involved even the crudest nuclear weapon.
Of the two negotiations, the one on Korea — a six-party forum of Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and North Korea — seems more advanced than the four-party talk on Iran (among France, Germany, Britain and Iran). Last September an apparent agreement in principle was reached in Beijing that North Korea will give up its nuclear program if the other parties provide adequate assurances of security, economic help in the post-nuclear period and a substitute for the power generation allegedly lost by abandoning the nuclear program. But each side has demanded that the other fulfill all its obligations before it undertakes its own; a serious effort to discuss a concurrent schedule has been prevented by North Korea's tactic of stringing out the period between each session, perhaps to gain time for strengthening its nuclear arsenal.
With respect to Iran, there isn't even a formal agreement on what the objective is. Iran has refused to agree to international control over its uranium enrichment program, in the absence of which no control over a weapons program is meaningful.
The public debate often focuses on whether the United States is prepared to engage in bilateral discussions with North Korea or Iran. With respect to Korea, that is a subsidiary issue. The six-power talks provide adequate opportunity for a bilateral exchange of views. What Pyongyang is attempting to achieve — and what the Bush administration has rightly resisted — is a separate negotiation with Washington outside the six-party framework, which would prevent other parties in the Beijing process from undertaking joint responsibilities. If bilateral talks replaced the six-party forum, some of America's present partners might choose to place the onus for breaking every deadlock on Washington, in effect isolating the United States.
The same considerations apply even more strongly to bilateral negotiations with Iran at this stage. Until now formal negotiations have been prevented by the memory of the hostage crisis, Iranian support of terrorist groups and the aggressive rhetoric of the Iranian president. Nor does the Iranian president's letter remove these inhibitions. Nevertheless, on a matter so directly involving its security, the United States should not negotiate through proxies, however closely allied. If America is prepared to negotiate with North Korea over proliferation in the six-party forum, and with Iran in Baghdad over Iraqi security, it must be possible to devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran that would permit the United States to participate — especially in light of what is at stake.
An indefinite continuation of the stalemate would amount to a de facto acquiescence by the international community in letting new entrants into the nuclear club. In Asia, it would spell the near-certain addition of South Korea and Japan; in the Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia could enter the field. In such a world, all significant industrial countries would consider nuclear weapons an indispensable status symbol. Radical elements throughout the Islamic world and elsewhere would gain strength from the successful defiance of the major nuclear powers.
The management of a nuclear-armed world would be infinitely more complex than maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers. The various nuclear countries would not only have to maintain deterrent balances with their own adversaries, a process that would not necessarily follow the principles and practices evolved over decades among the existing nuclear states. They would also have the ability and incentives to declare themselves as interested parties in general confrontations. Especially Iran, and eventually other countries of similar orientation, would be able to use nuclear arsenals to protect their revolutionary activities around the world.
There is an argument on behalf of acquiescing in proliferation which holds that new nuclear countries have proved responsible in the past. But this is not endorsed by experience. Pakistan proliferated its nuclear technology through the A.Q. Khan project; North Korea has been an active proliferator. In addition, the safeguarding of nuclear material on the territories of emerging nuclear countries is bound to be more porous and less sophisticated.
Diplomacy needs a new impetus. As a first step, the United States and its negotiating partners need to agree on how much time is available for negotiations. There seems to be general agreement that Pyongyang is producing enough plutonium for several weapons a year; there is some disagreement about progress in producing actual operational weapons in the absence of testing. Estimates on how close Tehran is to producing its first nuclear weapon range from two to 10 years. Given the risks and stakes, this gap needs to be narrowed. Any consideration of diplomatic pace must take account of the fact that in 2008 governments in both Russia and the United States will change; this will impose a hiatus on diplomacy while the governments are preoccupied with transition and, in America, restaffing the executive branch.
The next step is to recognize the difference between multiparty negotiations and a preferred strategy of regime change. There are no governments in the world whose replacement by responsible regimes would contribute more to international peace and security than those governing Pyongyang and Tehran. But none of the participants in the existing or foreseeable forums will support a policy explicitly aiming for regime change. Inevitably, a negotiation on nuclear disarmament will involve compensation in security and economic benefits in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons capabilities and is, in that sense, incompatible with regime change.
Focusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue. The United States should oppose nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran regardless of the government that builds them.
The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War: no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary, but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialogue within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union as the evil empire.
On Korea, progress requires agreement regarding the political evolution of the Korean Peninsula and of Northeast Asia. The expectation that China is so reluctant to see nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula — and therefore ultimately in Japan — that it will sooner or later bring the needed pressure on North Korea has so far been disappointed. This is because China has not only military concerns but also strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula. It will try to avoid an outcome in Korea that leads to the sudden collapse of an ally, producing a flood of Korean refugees into China as well as turmoil on its borders. For these reasons, a strategic dialogue with Beijing must be an important component of a negotiating strategy that also addresses Pyongyang's desire for security.
Though America is represented in the six-party forum by an exceptional diplomat in Christopher Hill, periodic engagement at a higher level is needed to give the necessary direction to his efforts. The objective should be an understanding regarding security and political evolution in Northeast Asia that requires no changes in sovereignty as part of the process of denuclearization but leaves open the prospect of Korean unification through negotiations or internal evolution.
Parallel considerations apply to the case of Iran. The current negotiating forum is highly dysfunctional. Three European countries in close coordination with the United States are acting partly as America's surrogate. China and Russia do not participate in the negotiations but are involved when their consequences go before the U.N. Security Council — a procedure enabling Iran to play off the nuclear powers against each other.
A more coherent forum for negotiation would combine the three European nations with the United States, China and Russia as the countries most directly affected and in the best position to act jointly in the Security Council. This could be set up after the passage of the Security Council resolution now under discussion. It would permit elaboration of the one hopeful scheme that has emerged in Iranian diplomacy. Put forward by Russia, it is to move certain enrichment operations out of Iran into Russia, thereby preventing clandestine weaponization. The new, broader forum could be used to establish an international enrichment program applicable to future nuclear technologies to curb the looming specter of unchecked proliferation.
Obviously, nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented simply by multiplying negotiating forums. The experience with existing conferences demonstrates the capacity for procrastination and obfuscation. To be effective, diplomacy must involve a willingness to provide clear penalties for obstruction.
Only after we have created the requisite negotiating framework and explored all aspects of diplomacy should the issue of military measures be addressed. But neither should force be rejected in principle and for all time before we know the circumstances in which this last resort should be considered.
The issue before the nations involved is similar to what the world faced in 1938 and at the beginning of the Cold War: whether to overcome fears and hesitancy about undertaking the difficult path demanded by necessity. The failure of that test in 1938 produced a catastrophic war; the ability to master it in the immediate aftermath of World War II led to victory without war.
The debates surrounding these issues will be conducted in the waning years of an American adm1inistration. On the surface, this may seem to guarantee partisanship. But thoughtful observers in both parties will know that the consequences of the decisions before us will have to be managed in a new administration. The nuclear issue, capable of destroying mankind, may thus, one hopes, bring us together in the end.
四、譯文拾貝
U.N. Security Council
中文解釋：聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)，負(fù)責(zé)維護(hù)國(guó)際和平與安全的核心機(jī)構(gòu)。
原文語(yǔ)境：伊朗試圖阻礙安理會(huì)審議其違反《不擴(kuò)散核武器條約》的行為（"obstruct U.N. Security Council deliberations"）。
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
中文解釋：《不擴(kuò)散核武器條約》，限制核武器擴(kuò)散的國(guó)際協(xié)定。
原文語(yǔ)境：伊朗無(wú)視其根據(jù)NPT承擔(dān)的義務(wù)（"Iran's disregard of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty"）。
Nuclear Proliferation
中文解釋：核擴(kuò)散，指核武器技術(shù)或材料向非核國(guó)家的傳播。
原文語(yǔ)境：伊朗和朝鮮的核擴(kuò)散問(wèn)題成為國(guó)際外交的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)（"negotiations on Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation mark a watershed"）。
Six-Party Talks
中文解釋：六方會(huì)談，涉及朝核問(wèn)題的多邊談判機(jī)制（中、美、俄、日、韓、朝）。
原文語(yǔ)境：六方會(huì)談比伊朗問(wèn)題四方會(huì)談更成熟（"the one on Korea — a six-party forum... seems more advanced"）。
Four-Party Talk
中文解釋：四方會(huì)談，指法、德、英與伊朗就核問(wèn)題的早期談判框架。
原文語(yǔ)境：與六方會(huì)談對(duì)比，四方會(huì)談未達(dá)成正式目標(biāo)（"there isn't even a formal agreement on what the objective is"）。
Uranium Enrichment Program
中文解釋：鈾濃縮計(jì)劃，用于生產(chǎn)核燃料或核武器的關(guān)鍵技術(shù)。
原文語(yǔ)境：伊朗拒絕國(guó)際社會(huì)對(duì)其鈾濃縮計(jì)劃的控制（"Iran has refused to agree to international control over its uranium enrichment program"）。
Nuclear Arsenal
中文解釋：核武庫(kù)，指國(guó)家擁有的核武器及其運(yùn)載工具的總稱。
原文語(yǔ)境：朝鮮拖延談判以加強(qiáng)核武庫(kù)（"North Korea's tactic... to gain time for strengthening its nuclear arsenal"）。
Deterrent Balance
中文解釋：威懾平衡，通過(guò)核力量維持戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定的狀態(tài)。
原文語(yǔ)境：冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期美蘇的威懾平衡比多極核世界更簡(jiǎn)單（"maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers"）。
Regime Change
中文解釋：政權(quán)更迭，通過(guò)外部干預(yù)改變某國(guó)政權(quán)。
原文語(yǔ)境：美國(guó)應(yīng)反對(duì)核武器，無(wú)論政權(quán)如何（"oppose nuclear weapons... regardless of the government that builds them"）。
Containment Policy
中文解釋：遏制政策，通過(guò)限制對(duì)手?jǐn)U張來(lái)維護(hù)自身利益（如冷戰(zhàn)對(duì)蘇聯(lián)）。
原文語(yǔ)境：去核化外交可比擬為遏制政策（"comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War"）。
Security Assurances
中文解釋：安全保證，承諾不攻擊或保護(hù)他國(guó)安全的措施。
原文語(yǔ)境：朝鮮要求其他方提供安全保證以棄核（"provide adequate assurances of security"）。
Plutonium Production
中文解釋：钚生產(chǎn)，用于制造核武器的關(guān)鍵材料。
原文語(yǔ)境：朝鮮每年生產(chǎn)足夠制造多枚核武器的钚（"Pyongyang is producing enough plutonium for several weapons a year"）。
Nuclear Disarmament
中文解釋：核裁軍，削減或消除核武器的過(guò)程。
原文語(yǔ)境：核裁軍談判需以安全經(jīng)濟(jì)利益補(bǔ)償棄核國(guó)（"involve compensation... in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons"）。
Bilateral Discussions
中文解釋：雙邊討論，兩國(guó)間的直接談判。
原文語(yǔ)境：美國(guó)拒絕朝鮮在六方框架外進(jìn)行雙邊談判（"resist a separate negotiation with Washington outside the six-party framework"）。
Multilateral Negotiations
中文解釋：多邊談判，涉及多國(guó)的協(xié)商機(jī)制。
原文語(yǔ)境：美國(guó)需設(shè)計(jì)多邊場(chǎng)合與伊朗進(jìn)行核談判（"devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran"）。
Terrorist Groups
中文解釋：恐怖組織，從事恐怖活動(dòng)的非國(guó)家行為體。
原文語(yǔ)境：伊朗支持恐怖組織阻礙正式談判（"Iranian support of terrorist groups"）。
Hostage Crisis
中文解釋：人質(zhì)危機(jī)，指1979年伊朗扣押美國(guó)外交人員事件。
原文語(yǔ)境：人質(zhì)危機(jī)的記憶阻礙美伊談判（"the memory of the hostage crisis"）。
A.Q. Khan Project
中文解釋：A·Q·汗項(xiàng)目，巴基斯坦核科學(xué)家主導(dǎo)的核技術(shù)擴(kuò)散網(wǎng)絡(luò)。
原文語(yǔ)境：巴基斯坦通過(guò)此項(xiàng)目擴(kuò)散核技術(shù)（"Pakistan proliferated its nuclear technology through the A.Q. Khan project"）。
Nuclear Club
中文解釋：核俱樂(lè)部，指擁有核武器的國(guó)家群體。
原文語(yǔ)境：國(guó)際默許新國(guó)家加入核俱樂(lè)部將引發(fā)連鎖反應(yīng)（"letting new entrants into the nuclear club"）。
Radical Elements
中文解釋：激進(jìn)分子，主張極端主義或暴力變革的群體。
原文語(yǔ)境：激進(jìn)分子因核大國(guó)被挑釁成功而壯大（"radical elements... would gain strength from the successful defiance"）。
Strategic Dialogue
中文解釋：戰(zhàn)略對(duì)話，國(guó)家間就長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略問(wèn)題進(jìn)行的溝通。
原文語(yǔ)境：與中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略對(duì)話是解決朝核問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵（"a strategic dialogue with Beijing must be an important component"）。
Political Evolution
中文解釋：政治演變，國(guó)家政治制度的漸進(jìn)變革。
原文語(yǔ)境：朝鮮半島的政治演變需與去核化同步（"an understanding regarding... political evolution in Northeast Asia"）。
Use of Force
中文解釋：使用武力，通過(guò)軍事手段解決問(wèn)題。
原文語(yǔ)境：外交失敗后需在武力與失控世界間選擇（"leave us with a choice between the use of force"）。
Denuclearization
中文解釋：去核化，徹底消除核武器或相關(guān)設(shè)施。
原文語(yǔ)境：將政權(quán)更迭與去核化混淆是錯(cuò)誤（"Focusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue"）。
Cold War Superpowers
中文解釋：冷戰(zhàn)超級(jí)大國(guó)，特指美蘇兩極格局。
原文語(yǔ)境：冷戰(zhàn)威懾平衡比多極核世界更易管理（"maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers"）。
Security Council Resolution
中文解釋：安理會(huì)決議，聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)通過(guò)的有約束力決定。
原文語(yǔ)境：新談判框架可在安理會(huì)決議通過(guò)后建立（"set up after the passage of the Security Council resolution"）。
Nuclear Material Safeguarding
中文解釋：核材料保護(hù)，防止核材料被濫用的國(guó)際措施。
原文語(yǔ)境：新興核國(guó)家的核材料保護(hù)更薄弱（"safeguarding of nuclear material... is bound to be more porous"）。
Preemptive Challenge
中文解釋：先發(fā)制人的挑戰(zhàn)，主動(dòng)出擊以預(yù)防威脅。
原文語(yǔ)境：遏制政策不挑戰(zhàn)對(duì)手的外部安全（"no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary"）。
Status Symbol
中文解釋：地位象征，核武器被視為國(guó)家實(shí)力的標(biāo)志。
原文語(yǔ)境：工業(yè)國(guó)將核武器視為必要地位象征（"consider nuclear weapons an indispensable status symbol"）。
Nuclear Deterrent
中文解釋：核威懾，通過(guò)核武器阻止他國(guó)攻擊的戰(zhàn)略。
原文語(yǔ)境：各國(guó)需維持與對(duì)手的核威懾平衡（"maintain deterrent balances with their own adversaries"）。
Military Measures
中文解釋：軍事措施，以武力手段應(yīng)對(duì)威脅的行動(dòng)。
原文語(yǔ)境：軍事手段應(yīng)在窮盡外交后考慮（"the issue of military measures be addressed... as a last resort"）。
Catastrophic War
中文解釋：災(zāi)難性戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，指大規(guī)模毀滅性沖突（如核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)）。
原文語(yǔ)境：1938年的外交失敗導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難性戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（"The failure of that test in 1938 produced a catastrophic war"）。
Partisanship
中文解釋：黨派之爭(zhēng)，政策制定中的政黨對(duì)立。
原文語(yǔ)境：美國(guó)政府的末期可能加劇黨派分歧（"this may seem to guarantee partisanship"）。
Regime Security
中文解釋：政權(quán)安全，國(guó)家政權(quán)維持統(tǒng)治穩(wěn)定的需求。
原文語(yǔ)境：中國(guó)擔(dān)憂朝鮮政權(quán)崩潰影響自身安全（"avoid an outcome... leading to the sudden collapse of an ally"）。
Economic Benefits
中文解釋：經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，通過(guò)協(xié)議獲得的經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)償或合作。
原文語(yǔ)境：棄核需以安全經(jīng)濟(jì)利益為交換（"compensation in security and economic benefits"）。
Strategic Objectives
中文解釋：戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)，國(guó)家長(zhǎng)期追求的核心利益。
原文語(yǔ)境：中國(guó)在朝鮮半島有軍事和戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)（"China has not only military concerns but also strategic objectives"）。
Revolutionary Activities
中文解釋：革命活動(dòng)，旨在顛覆現(xiàn)有國(guó)際秩序的行動(dòng)。
原文語(yǔ)境：伊朗可能利用核武庫(kù)保護(hù)其全球革命活動(dòng)（"use nuclear arsenals to protect their revolutionary activities"）。
International Control
中文解釋：國(guó)際控制，多邊機(jī)制對(duì)某國(guó)行為的監(jiān)督。
原文語(yǔ)境：鈾濃縮計(jì)劃缺乏國(guó)際控制則無(wú)意義（"no control over a weapons program is meaningful"）。
Deadlock
中文解釋：僵局，談判中無(wú)法推進(jìn)的停滯狀態(tài)。
原文語(yǔ)境：雙邊談判或使美國(guó)承擔(dān)打破僵局的責(zé)任（"place the onus for breaking every deadlock on Washington"）。
Aggressive Rhetoric
中文解釋：激進(jìn)言論，具有挑釁性的政治表態(tài)。
原文語(yǔ)境：伊朗總統(tǒng)的激進(jìn)言論阻礙談判（"the aggressive rhetoric of the Iranian president"）。
Nuclear Testing
中文解釋：核試驗(yàn)，測(cè)試核武器性能的爆炸實(shí)驗(yàn)。
原文語(yǔ)境：朝鮮未進(jìn)行核試驗(yàn)，武器化進(jìn)度存疑（"progress in producing actual operational weapons in the absence of testing"）。
Islamic World
中文解釋：伊斯蘭世界，以穆斯林為主體的國(guó)家或地區(qū)。
原文語(yǔ)境：激進(jìn)勢(shì)力在伊斯蘭世界可能因核擴(kuò)散壯大（"radical elements throughout the Islamic world... would gain strength"）。
Diplomatic Pace
中文解釋：外交節(jié)奏，談判進(jìn)程的時(shí)間安排與緊迫性。
原文語(yǔ)境：需考慮2008年美俄政府更迭對(duì)節(jié)奏的影響（"Any consideration of diplomatic pace must take account of... 2008"）。
Unchecked Proliferation
中文解釋：無(wú)限制擴(kuò)散，缺乏國(guó)際約束的核技術(shù)傳播。
原文語(yǔ)境：需建立國(guó)際濃縮計(jì)劃遏制無(wú)限制擴(kuò)散（"curb the looming specter of unchecked proliferation"）。
Procrastination
中文解釋：拖延戰(zhàn)術(shù)，故意延長(zhǎng)談判時(shí)間以獲利。
原文語(yǔ)境：現(xiàn)有會(huì)議顯示拖延與混淆的能力（"demonstrates the capacity for procrastination and obfuscation"）。
Last Resort
中文解釋：最后手段，當(dāng)其他方法失效時(shí)采取的措施。
原文語(yǔ)境：軍事手段是最后選擇，但不排除使用（"this last resort should be considered"）。
Korean Unification
中文解釋：朝鮮統(tǒng)一，朝鮮半島南北合并的政治前景。
原文語(yǔ)境：去核化可能為朝鮮統(tǒng)一留出空間（"leaves open the prospect of Korean unification"）。
Executive Branch Restaffing
中文解釋：行政機(jī)構(gòu)人員重組，政府換屆后的職位調(diào)整。
原文語(yǔ)境：美國(guó)政府的過(guò)渡期將影響外交連續(xù)性（"restaffing the executive branch"）。
Power Projection
中文解釋：力量投射，國(guó)家向境外施加影響力的能力。
原文語(yǔ)境：遏制政策要求抵制對(duì)手的境外力量投射（"resistance to attempts to project its power abroad"）。
Nuanced Policy
中文解釋：細(xì)致政策，兼顧多重目標(biāo)的復(fù)雜策略。
原文語(yǔ)境：里根對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的對(duì)話邀請(qǐng)是細(xì)致政策的體現(xiàn)（"such a nuanced policy that caused Reagan to invite Brezhnev"）。
大外交青年智庫(kù)（簡(jiǎn)稱“大外交智庫(kù)”）（Glory Diplomacy Youth Think-tank，Glory Diplomacy或GDYT）是一家創(chuàng)辦于2017年的以外交安全為主的綜合性戰(zhàn)略研究機(jī)構(gòu)、社會(huì)/青年智庫(kù)，總部在中國(guó)深圳，是深圳首家非官方外交安全智庫(kù)、中國(guó)首家青年智庫(kù)，創(chuàng)始人是王蓋蓋。GDYT一直堅(jiān)持“只有修煉好內(nèi)功，才能放心去實(shí)戰(zhàn)”的發(fā)展理念，從2017年創(chuàng)始初期穩(wěn)扎穩(wěn)打，于2018年成立青年原創(chuàng)評(píng)論組（于2022年改組為《智本青析》編輯部）并創(chuàng)辦《智本青析》電子刊至今；2019年在海南開設(shè)分支機(jī)構(gòu)即海南大外交學(xué)會(huì)（GDYT HN），同年成立青年發(fā)展研究院，該中心在2019年創(chuàng)辦“大外交青年發(fā)展與實(shí)踐啟航項(xiàng)目”研修班至今，在2021年創(chuàng)辦“世界青年菁英坊《早點(diǎn)知道》講座項(xiàng)目”至今；2020年成立應(yīng)試就業(yè)研究院并創(chuàng)辦《真題解析》付費(fèi)專欄；同年7月，成立外交外事涉外安全決策咨詢公司，集中研究國(guó)家安全與國(guó)際安全、海外利益分析與保護(hù)、青年外交與青年發(fā)展、區(qū)域國(guó)別與國(guó)際組織、跨國(guó)公司與全球治理等事務(wù)；2021年成立外文編譯評(píng)議組并創(chuàng)辦《大譯編參》電子刊至今（該編輯部于2022年創(chuàng)辦《每日信報(bào)》微電子日刊），同年成立區(qū)域國(guó)別研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《新國(guó)別簡(jiǎn)報(bào)》欄目）；2022年成立世界外交數(shù)據(jù)中心、全球治理研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《鴻士論天下》欄目）、國(guó)家安全研究院、黨的理論創(chuàng)新研究中心，并合并所有專訪項(xiàng)目（青坊談、最有影響力人物訪談、21世紀(jì)中國(guó)外交天團(tuán)、學(xué)人專訪等）整合為《與名人對(duì)話》欄目，組建“青年智庫(kù)特種部隊(duì)”全職高精尖部門（該部門于2023年創(chuàng)辦《中華內(nèi)參》內(nèi)刊）和全球范圍內(nèi)的“大中華菁英圈”（該共同體于2024年創(chuàng)辦《全球統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)》內(nèi)刊），開啟“Smallibrary·小書屋”全球青年閱讀挑戰(zhàn)計(jì)劃（該計(jì)劃于2022年創(chuàng)辦《智庫(kù)書屋》欄目），運(yùn)營(yíng)新知太學(xué)（網(wǎng)絡(luò)）書院（該書院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《線上共讀》欄目）；2023年，成立全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、全球?yàn)硡^(qū)研究院、跨國(guó)公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心、數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院、海洋治理研究中心、基式外交研究中心，在香港開設(shè)分支機(jī)構(gòu)“香港大外交學(xué)會(huì)（GDYT HK）”，創(chuàng)辦“華灣國(guó)際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”國(guó)際人才交流平臺(tái)，創(chuàng)辦“灣山友（WSY）”戶外爬山徒步讀書研討國(guó)際精英俱樂(lè)部；2024年，成立新型智庫(kù)研究院、企業(yè)出海研究院（整合全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、跨國(guó)公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心等三大中心于一體）、“荔林讀書會(huì)（LOC）”（整合“國(guó)關(guān)讀書會(huì)”“華灣讀書會(huì)”“灣山友讀書會(huì)”“全球4%讀書會(huì)”等四大讀書會(huì)于一體）等。GDYT從2021年以來(lái)，多次舉辦全國(guó)（含全球）青年國(guó)際問(wèn)題學(xué)術(shù)研討、思想交流、政策分析與企業(yè)出海等活動(dòng)，如“國(guó)際問(wèn)題研究型青年智庫(kù)發(fā)展模式探索論壇”、“新型國(guó)際問(wèn)題青年智庫(kù)建設(shè)與發(fā)展論壇”、“國(guó)際關(guān)系青年辯論賽”、“國(guó)際關(guān)系青年辯論賽最佳辯手論壇”、“世界青年菁英坊《早點(diǎn)知道》系列講座”、“國(guó)際問(wèn)題/區(qū)域國(guó)別學(xué)術(shù)研討會(huì)（GDYT·ISAS）”系列活動(dòng)、“《與名人對(duì)話》系列采訪活動(dòng)”、“《鴻士論天下》系列講座活動(dòng)”、“新時(shí)代中國(guó)國(guó)際戰(zhàn)略高端論壇與菁英論壇”、“華灣國(guó)際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”系列活動(dòng)、“GDYT與國(guó)際知名學(xué)者對(duì)話”、“灣山友俱樂(lè)部粵港澳國(guó)際精英戶外實(shí)踐交流”系列活動(dòng)、“荔林讀書會(huì)”國(guó)際前沿思想沙龍等等。自創(chuàng)辦以來(lái)，GDYT一直致力于“讓壹億中國(guó)大外交青年智慧與方案被全球看見(jiàn)”，聚集全球各地有志青年為實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人、企業(yè)、社會(huì)、國(guó)家和世界和平發(fā)展而奮斗，至2021年底，已發(fā)展成集專家顧問(wèn)、研究員（含高級(jí)）、特約研究員（含高級(jí)）、助理研究員、編譯評(píng)議員、時(shí)政評(píng)論員、實(shí)習(xí)生、志愿者等全方位國(guó)際人才體系（200人）的樣本標(biāo)桿青年智庫(kù)，聚焦中國(guó)與全球大外交領(lǐng)域青年的原創(chuàng)方案、發(fā)展計(jì)劃和外交延伸等助力與服務(wù)，在“對(duì)照全球外交發(fā)展、對(duì)接世界高端智庫(kù)、對(duì)比新型平臺(tái)建設(shè)”的三原則指導(dǎo)下，為中國(guó)的外交與安全發(fā)展貢獻(xiàn)青年力量和方案，為中央及地方政府部門提供內(nèi)參、為企業(yè)國(guó)內(nèi)外發(fā)展提供商業(yè)咨詢、為國(guó)際問(wèn)題智庫(kù)建設(shè)提供調(diào)研路徑、為非政府組織及個(gè)人提供咨詢等服務(wù)，被海內(nèi)外青年譽(yù)為現(xiàn)代智囊的“青年精英大腦集中營(yíng)、集散地”，是全球新型外交青年智庫(kù)的開創(chuàng)者和代言人！
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